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1. Introduction 
 
We investigate intergenerational top income mobility, that is, the father-son and father-daughter 
income mobility; the correlation between father and son-in-law and father and daughter-in-law—
and the same for mother-child/child-in-law relationships - and the correlation between the two 
generations’ aggregated household incomes. Hence, assortative mating comes in as an explanation 
of the appearance of ‘inherited’ income among top-income households. 
 We use information for the whole population from administrative registers at Statistics 
Denmark for the period 1980–2008, which allow us to investigate intergenerational income 
mobility throughout the income distribution. 
 The following section gives the background and a short review of the literature, and in the 
third section the empirical framework is discussed. The data are described in the fourth section and 
section five presents the results of the analyses. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Background 
The literature shows that intergenerational father-son income mobility is decreasing within the top 
incomes, reaching a very low level for the very top. This holds for Canada (Corak & Heitsz, 1999) 
and also for Denmark and Sweden, which, despite their low income inequality and high 
intergenerational income mobility (elasticities of 0.24 and 0.26)
1
, has a top income elasticity of 0.47 
and 0.90 (Munk et al., 2015; Björklund et al., 2012).  
 The mother-daughter intergenerational income mobility has also been investigated, for 
example, by Österberg (2000), who shows that mother’s earnings influence child’s earnings less 
                                                 
1
 Jäntti et al. (2006) and Black & Devereux (2011) found average elasticities for father-son at about 0.5–0.6 for the US 
and 0.3 for the UK. 
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than that of the father, and that this difference is lower for daughters than for sons. By looking at 
different intervals of the household income distribution, Hirvonen (2008) finds that 
intergenerational income mobility is higher in the upper than in the lower end, but that mobility in 
the top end is smaller (even for daughters) than in the middle range (see also Raaum et al., 2007). 
The findings raise the question of marriage as a mediator of different generations’ access to 
economic resources. Mare (1991; 2000) shows that spouses tend to be similar in terms of 
educational attainment, occupation and ethnic background (for an early example, see Glenn, Ross & 
Tully, 1974). Chiappori et al. (2011) show that not only socioeconomic characteristics but also 
anthropometric characteristics/physical attractiveness matter for the matching on the marriage 
market. For Germany and Britain, Ermish et al. (2006) find that 40–50 % of the correlation between 
parents’ and children’s permanent family income can be attributed to the spouse, due to a high 
correlation between the spouses’ human capital, and conclude that: “both parents and parents-in-law 
shape their offspring’s status”. Particularly at the top end of the income distribution, parents have a 
preference for continuing the family position by having “high quality” children (Kalenkoski & 
Foster, 2008; Lefgren & McIntyre, 2006). Hence, by extending the relationship between generations 
to mother/father couple and child/spouse couple, even higher elasticities are likely to be found.  
 
3. Empirical framework  
 
Following usual practice within mobility studies, the intergenerational determination of children’s 
incomes can be expressed by the following regression equation: 
 
(1) log yci = αc + βc log ypi + εcij , 
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where log yci denotes the natural logarithm of income of a child in family i and ypi the corresponding 
measure of the parent. The error term εci depicts the combined effect on the child’s income of 
factors orthogonal to parental income, and βc is the intergenerational elasticity of the child’s 
permanent income given the parent’s income. The model also controls for the first generation’s age 
and age squared, although not shown in (1).  
 If assortative mating in the second generation is present, we will find a high correlation 
between the child’s and his/her partner’s income, see Hirvonen (2008). This can be expressed as  
 
(2) γ = corr (log yci , log ypai ) , 
 
where pa indicates the partner. A high level of assortative mating—particularly if this is also the 
case for the first generation—will diminish intergenerational mobility on a family-to-family level 
and, conversely, if the matching is random and not conditional on income, it will accentuate 
mobility. The family-to-family intergenerational income mobility can be depicted as 
 
(3) log ycpai = αcpa + βcpa log yfmi + εcpai , 
 
where ycpa (child and his/her partner) is the second generation’s family income and yfmi is the first 
generation’s family income, where fm indicates father and mother. 
 Intergenerational income persistence on a family level, βcpa, will therefore be determined by 
two different channels
2
: the parent to child channel, βc, and the assortative mating determinant, 
calculated as either the elasticity of parents and children-in-laws’ income relationships or simply as 
                                                 
2
 Mitnik et al. (2015) add a third channel, namely the likelihood of becoming and staying married, which are found to 
be correlated with parental income, i.e. the higher income of origin the higher the chances for this to happen. (det her 
komma skal vist omskrives. Hvad refererer “origin” til og origin mht hvad? Hvad henviser “this” til?).  
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the differential between βcpa and βc. Obviously, this requires that the first generation and second 
generation are married/cohabiting within their respective generations, while the usual 
intergenerational mobility analyses also include single families in each generation.  
 Because social heritage is not equally strong across the whole distribution—revealed as non-
linearity (Bratberg et al., 2007; Grawe, 2004; Hertz, 2005)—intergenerational income mobility is 
analysed over the full range by using piecewise linear regression estimations (spline regressions). 
This implies “separate” estimations for parent-child pairs belonging to different parent income 
percentiles, so-called “knots”—P50, P75, P90, P95, P99, P99.9—which allow the slopes to vary 
over the earnings and income distributions (Greene,  2012; Björklund et al. 2012). The 
interpretation of the β-coefficient in equation (1), therefore, is the percentage differential in the 
expected earnings or income of the child, given a percentage, marginal differential in earning or 
income of the parent, for example, within the top P99.9-100 fractile. 
  
4. Data  
 
The data stem from administrative registers at Statistics Denmark including information on 
earnings, capital income, taxes, and benefit payments, and education, labour market attachment, etc. 
for the period 1980–2008. A unique personal ID number allows linkage of the information of every 
individual in the registers with information of his/her spouse, children and parents. Using register 
information implies that the information for the whole population is included. 
 The data window covers 29 years and the best proxy of a permanent income is the income 
earned when being in the 30s; therefore, the second generation in this study is aged 35–42 years in 
2008 or, equivalently, 7–14 years in 1980 (7–18 years when their parents’ incomes are included for 
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1980–84). This is considered to be a relatively broad age bracket, which is important for 
minimizing the problem of non-homogeneity in the residuals, see Lee & Solon (2009), who stresses 
that the assumption of unbiased measurement error does not hold for intergenerational income 
mobility.  
 Furthermore, it is important to note that even permanent income estimates based on five-year 
periods may underestimate the intergenerational persistence. Hendricks (2007) shows that measures 
of persistence based on lifetime earnings increase 30% compared with measures using only 5-year 
periods, and Hussain et al. (2009) find that the income measurements partly determine the results in 
intergenerational mobility studies (see also Mazumder, 2005). In our study, fathers are between 25 
and 88 years in 1984 for which reason we control for father’s age and age squared. 
We use the father-son and father-daughter—and mother-son and mother-daughter—correlations 
as well as the correlations between father’s income and son-in-law’s and daughter-in-law’s earnings 
and income. Because children-in-law are married/cohabitating, the same is necessarily also the case 
for sons and daughters, and this holds also for the parents. However, excluding singles from the 
regressions does not significantly change the coefficients for the different incomes (results are 
available on request), although the offspring of higher income parents is more likely to marry and 
stay married and thereby pooling resources with a spouse.    
The income concepts applied include individual earnings from work and/or business, capital 
income and total income, see Björklund et al. (2012) for application of similar definitions, and only 
individuals with positive total income in each of the five years (the 2004–2008 period for the child 
and the 1980–1984 period for the parent) are included. All incomes are inflated to 2008 using the 
CPI from Statistics Denmark. We apply the average of natural log of each year’s income. 
We exclude observations if the standardised residual is above 3. These outliers count to around 
1½ pct. of the observations, but the exclusion has no major impact on the estimated coefficient 
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structure, i.e. the correlations between coefficients for the estimates with and without the outliers 
are all above .96. 
The income sample includes up to 172,800 pairs of married fathers and married daughters/sons, 
and the earnings sample includes 135,785 pairs. The number of married father and son-in-laws and 
daughter-in-laws with (positive) income and earnings information is 69,997; 58,890; 113,245 and 
86,600. Hence, we have around 600 and 1,700 in the top-income percentile and, thereby, around 
60–170 in the 0.1 top-income percentile. 
 
Table 1 around here 
 
Table 1 show that the discrepancy between earnings and income increases with the income 
level, particularly for the second generation. At the top end of the distributions (P99), sons’ incomes 
are 10% higher than their earnings, and those of daughters are 9% higher, whereas fathers’ incomes 
are only 4% higher than their earnings. For the median pairs (P50) the differentials are 7%, 7% and 
0%, reflecting that the disparity of capital income has increased between the two generations, see 
Björklund et al. (2012) for nearly the same findings for Sweden. 
  When comparing married sons’ earnings and income with those of married daughters’, we 
found a difference for the median persons of about one third in both cases in favour of the sons. For 
children belonging to the top percentile, the difference between the two sexes is 73–74 pct. for 
earnings and income, and the same holds when comparing earnings and income of sons-in-law with 
those of daughters-in-law (75–77 pct.).  
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5. Results 
Intergenerational top-income mobility—parents to children 
 
In the following we show the results from the piecewise linear spline regressions across parent 
income fractiles examining how sensitive children’s earnings and incomes are to their parents’ 
earnings and incomes. For the estimations of parent to children-in-law mobility, we also refer to 
results obtained from spline regression estimations. To assure comparability with the parent-child 
estimations, the latter ones are also done solely for married sons and daughters, see Table 2. 
Table 2 shows that the intergenerational earnings elasticities for father-son and father-
daughter pairs increase up to a certain point after which they decrease, leaving the top percentile out 
of consideration. For married children only, we found elasticities equal to 0.016 and 0.017 for sons 
and daughters of fathers in the P0-25 against 0.430 and 0.265 for the P50-75 group, and 0.111 and 
0.093 for the P99-99.9 group (Table 2)—the same pattern is found for Sweden (Hirvonen, 2008). 
The somewhat smaller elasticities for father-daughter pairs are also found for incomes, except at the 
top end of the distribution. Where the father-son and father-daughter income elasticities are 0.040 
and 0.025 for the P0-25 group, they increase to 0.446 and 0.317 in the upper-middle P50-75 group
3
, 
and fall to 0.070 and 0.138 for the P99-99.9 group, implying that the income persistence for the 
father-daughter is double that of the father-son. 
 
Tables 2 and Table 3 around here 
 
                                                 
3
 The father-son earnings elasticity using OLS (e.g. not spline) is 0.176 and 0.244 when applying total income.  
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At the very top end of the income distribution (P99.9-100), we found that only the income 
elasticity for father-son is significant and very high, i.e. a 10% higher income among the P99.9-100 
group of fathers is correlated with a 8.79% higher income among their sons. For married daughters 
of the same group of rich fathers, the total income elasticity is not significant, which also holds for 
the earnings correlation for married sons, whereas that of married daughters is -0.328. This 
indicates that the higher the earnings of the father, the lower the earnings of his daughter in this 
upper end of the earnings distribution. 
Moreover, at the top end of the income distribution—P99-99.9—the father-married daughter  
income elasticities are greater than those for sons, indicating that daughters from well-off 
backgrounds are economically more like their parents than are sons when looking solely at married 
second-generation offspring. 
Table 2 also shows that for children-in-law the relationship between fathers’ and their 
daughters-in-law’s incomes is smaller than the relationship between fathers’ and their sons-in-law’s 
incomes. The father and children-in-law elasticities, however, are generally smaller than those of 
fathers and their offspring, so that the offspring is economically more alike their parents than are the 
children-in-law and is therefore more “reliable” in ensuring some persistence in keeping the social 
position intact. 
  
Parents to children-in-law elasticities 
 
For the median income fractile the correlations between sons’ and their wives’ incomes and 
between daughters’ and their husbands’ incomes are 0.258 and 0.199, respectively, while the same 
correlations are 0.157 and 0.113, respectively, for earnings (Table 4), which shows that it is easier 
for sons than for daughters to find economically equal partners in the middle of the income 
11 
 
distribution. By moving upwards in the earnings and income distributions, we find that the 
correlations increase for daughter-son-in-law relationships while it decreases for son-daughter-in-
law relationships, and at the top end of the distribution—99th and 99.5th fractiles—the son-daughter-
in-law relationship is not significant, whereas the daughter-son-in-law relationship remains 
significant, and the same holds for earnings. This indicates that assortative mating is more 
pronounced for rich daughters than for rich sons using earnings or total income as the economic 
measure. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 around here 
 
Finally, Table 5 shows that at the top end of the distribution—P99.9-100—the son-daughter-
in-law relationship is 0.259 for earnings and 0.763 for total income, while no significant 
relationships are found between the parents and their daughter’s family. Hence, at the same time as 
assortative mating or the same mating strategy for the two generations—in the top end of the 
income distribution is more pronounced for daughters than for sons; the intergenerational mobility 
is smaller for sons than for daughters, independent of using earnings or total income as the 
economic measure. 
 
6. Conclusion and Summary 
 
Most studies on intergenerational earnings and income mobility focus on the father-child 
transmission of opportunities and social status. In this study, we also looked at the mother-to-son 
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and mother-to-daughter transmission of income as well as at the correlation between the aggregated 
household incomes of the two generations. 
By applying data from administrative registers at Statistics Denmark, we were able to study the 
mobility throughout the income distribution, in particular the top end, since we had income 
information on all Danish citizens. We used piecewise linear spline regressions because of the non-
linearity in mobility over the income distribution. 
In line with most other studies, we found that the intergenerational elasticity is higher for income 
than for earnings and that these elasticities are smaller for father-daughter than for father-son pairs. 
At the very top end of the distribution—P99.9-100—the father-son income persistence is 0.466 but 
is not significant for father-daughter.  
We also found that mother-married child intergenerational earnings and income mobility are 
relatively close to each other, while income persistence is greater than earnings persistence for 
father-married child relationships at the top end of the distributions. This indicates that children, 
particularly sons, “gain” (e.g. ability to earn and acquire) more capital income from their father than 
from their mother. The income elasticity is greater than the earnings elasticity for father-married 
son relationships than for father-married daughter relationships. 
Another finding was that the father and children-in-law correlations are generally smaller than 
that of fathers and their offspring, so that the offspring is economically more alike their parents than 
are the children-in-law. This pattern indicates that a son-in-law is not as capable as a son of securing 
a high degree of income persistence from one generation to the next, and the same holds for 
daughters-in-law relatively to daughters—for both we found similar correlations relative to their 
fathers-in-law/fathers income throughout the income distribution. 
Finally, we found that intergenerational household income mobility is smaller for father and 
mother to son and daughter-in-law than for father and mother to daughter and son-in-law. This 
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holds for the whole income distribution as well as for the earnings distribution. At the top end of the 
income distribution—P99.9-100—the elasticities for parents and their daughter and son-in-law are 
not significant in contrast to that of parents and their son and daughter-in-law, where the elasticity is 
as high as 0.763. This coefficient is the second highest of all coefficients found in this study, 
indicating that at a family level there is a very high degree of economic persistence between 
generations among the rich in Denmark.  
14 
 
Bibliography 
Björklund, A., Roine, J.  & Waldenström, D. (2012) ‘Intergenerational top income mobility in Sweden: 
Capitalistic dynasties in the land of equal opportunity? ’ in Journal of Public Economics, 96, 474-
484. 
Black, S. E. & Devereux, P.J. (2011) ‘Recent Developments in Intergenerational Mobility’, in the 
Handbook of Labor Economics 4(5), 1487-1542 
Bratberg, E., Røed, K., Raaum, O., Naylor, R., Jäntti, M., Eriksson, T., & Österbacka, E. (2007) 
‘Nonlinearities in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility: Consequences for Cross-Country 
Comparisons’ in The Economic Journal, 117(518), 72-92. 
Chiappori, P.-A., Oreffice, S. & Quintana-Domeque, C. (2011) ‘Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and 
Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage Market’ in Journal of Political Economy, 120(4), 659-
695. 
Corak, M. & Heisz, A. (1999) ‘The Intergenerational Earnings and Income Mobility of Canadian Men: 
Evidence from Longitudinal Income Tax Data’ in Journal of Human Resources, 34(3): 504–533. 
Glenn, N.D., Ross, A.A. & Tully, J.C. (1974) ‘Patterns of Intergenerational Income Mobilities of 
Females through Marriage’ in American Sociological Review, 39(4), 683-699. 
Greene, W.H. (2012) ‘Econometric Analysis’, 7th edition. NJ, Pearson, Upper Saddle River.  
Grawe, N.D. (2004) ‘Reconsidering the Use of Nonlinearities in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility as 
a Test for Credit Constraints’ in The Journal of Human Resources, 39(3), 813-827. 
Hendricks, L. (2007) ‘The Intergenerational Persistence of Lifetime Earnings’ in European Economic 
Review, 51, 125-144. 
Hertz, T. (2005) ‘Rags, Riches, and Race: The Intergenerational Economic Mobility 
of Black and White Families in the United States.’ in Bowles, Gintis & Groves (eds.): Unequal 
Chances: Family Background and Economic Success. New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 165–
91’ 
15 
 
Hirvonen, L.H. (2008) ‘Intergenerational Earnings Mobility Among Daughters and Sons Evidence from 
Sweden and a Comparison with the United States’ in American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 
67(5), 779-826. 
Hussain, M.A., Munk, M.D. & Bonke, J. (2009) ‘Intergenerational Earnings Mobilities – How Sensitive 
are they to Income Measures?’ in Journal of Income Distribution, 18 (3/4), 79-92. 
Jäntti, M., Bratsberg, B. Røed, K., Raaum, O., Naylor, R., Österbacka, E., Björklund, A. & Eriksson, T. 
(2006) ‘American exceptionalism in a new Light: A comparison of intergenerational earnings 
mobility in the Nordic countries, the United Kingdom and the United States’ Discussion paper no. 
1938 (Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn). 
Kalenkoski, C. M. & Foster, G. (2008) ‘The Quality of Time Spent with Children in Australian 
Households ’ in Review of Economics of the Household, 6(3), 243-66. 
Lee, C.-I. & Solon, G. (2009) ‘Trends in Intergenerational Income Mobility’ in The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 91(4), 766–772. 
Lefgren, L. & McIntyre, F.  (2006) ‘The Relationship between Women’s Education and Marriage 
Outcomes’ in Journal of Labor Economics, 24(4), 787-830.  
Mare, R.D. (1991) ‘Five Decades of educational assortative mating’ in American Sociological Review, 
56(1), 15-32. 
Mare, R.D. (2000) ‘Assortative Mating, Intergenerational Mobility, and Educational Inequality’ 
Working Paper CCPR-004-00. Los Angeles: California Center for Population Research, University 
of California–Los Angeles. 
Mazumder, B. (2005) ‘The Apple Falls Even Closer to the Tree than We Thought: New and Revised 
Estimates of Intergenerational Inheritance of Earnings’ in Bowles, Gintis & Groves (eds.): Unequal 
Chances: Family Background and Economic Success. New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 80-
99. 
16 
 
Mitnik, P.A., Bryant, V., Weber, M. and Grusky, D.B. (2015). ‘New Estimates of Intergeneratonal 
Mobility Using Administrative Data’. Stanford Center of Poverty and Inequality.  
Munk, M.D., Bonke, J. & Hussain, M.A. (2015). ‘Intergenerational Top Income Persistence: Denmark half 
the size of Sweden’ in Economics Letters. (Forthcoming). 
Raaum, O., Bratsberg, B., Røed, K., Österbacka, E., Eriksson, T., Jäntti, M. & Naylor, R.A. (2007) 
‘Marital sorting, household labor supply and intergenerational earnings mobility across countries’, in 
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, Article 7. 
Österberg, T. (2000) ‘Intergenerational Income Mobility in Sweden: What do Tax-Data Show?’ in 
Review of Income and Wealth, 46(4), 421-436. 
  
17 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for earnings and total income. Father-married-child/child-in-law, 
and father-couple – child-couple. 1,000 DKK. 2008-prices. 
  Mean St.dev. Min. P10 P50 P90 P95 P99 Max. 
Father-married son, n=135,785 and 164,155        
Earnings: Father 358.4 217.82 0.6 192 313 407 552 696 8,799 
 Son 471.6 346.12 0.1 272 396 523 722 917 38,416 
Income: Father 365.7 263.16 0.2 181 314 412 564 724 12,821 
 Son 512.3 427.62 0.0 285 425 563 785 1,008 41,869 
Father-married daughter, n=132,307 and 172,800       
Earnings: Father 352.4 221.09 1.1 188 310 401 540 681 17,219 
 Dau. 312.9 137.84 0.8 193 292 357 443 531 6,651 
Income: Father 358.8 274.51 0.1 175 310 405 553 706 24,909 
 Dau. 337.9 180.15 0.0 204 313 388 484 579 34,262 
Father- son-in-law, n=58,890 and 69,997        
Earnings: Father 358.7 229.50 1.6 197 314 406 546 691 17,219 
 Son-in-law 475.0 336.93 0.1 275 401 529 724 912 25,332 
Income: Father 368.9 288.75 1.0 190 318 414 562 721 24,909 
 Son-in-law 518.2 412.21 0.2 290 432 572 792 1,011 25,297 
Father- daughter-in-law, n=86,600 and 113,245       
Earnings: Father 360.7 220.23 0.7 193 315 409 556 701 8,799 
 Da.-in-law 305.3 134.18 2.0 187 285 349 435 520 6,695 
Income: Father 368.5 269.01 1.0 182 315 414 569 734 10,955 
 Da.-in-law 332.5 159.70 0.0 202 309 381 476 570 8,937 
Father and mother- son and daughter-in-law, n=110,755 and 117,609 
Earnings: Parents 463.5 239.62 0.7 238 434 548 696 829 8,799 
 Son/spouse 742.7 398.85 4.0 446 675 839 1,082 1,294 38,418 
Income: Parents 516.2 292.81 28.8 275 474 591 759 924 11,604 
 Son/spouse 855.4 501.44 36.5 541 756 947 1,233 1,496 42,241 
Father and mother - daughter and son-in-law, n=92,343 and 97,474     
Earnings: Parents 464.3 240.71 0.9 245 437 547 690 815 17,219 
 Da/spouse 745.9 370.11 3.6 450 680 843 1,086 1,301 25,548 
Income: Parents 517.0 298.91 38.7 283 478 591 752 907 25,072 
 Da/spouse 858.2 463.83 36.5 546 762 952 1,237 1,506 24,860 
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Table 2. Earnings and income elasticities for father and children and children-in-law. Spline regression. 
  P0-25 P25-50 P50-75 P75-90 P90-95 P95-99 P99-99.9 P99.9-100 
Earnings 
        Son 0.022** 0.304** 0.413** 0.243** 0.281** 0.220** 0.162** -0.076 
Daughter 0.018** 0.241** 0.264** 0.181** 0.148** 0.012 0.038 -0.239** 
Married son 0.016** 0.323** 0.430** 0.236** 0.256** 0.239** 0.111** 0.135 
Married daughter 0.017** 0.236** 0.265** 0.179** 0.139** 0.023 0.093* -0.328** 
Son-in-law 0.008 0.241** 0.286** 0.187** 0.147* 0.099* 0.141* -0.249* 
Daughter-in-law 0.017** 0.213** 0.193** 0.079** 0.01 0.041 0.01 -0.308* 
Total income 
        Son 0.065** 0.390** 0.428** 0.345** 0.252** 0.288** 0.199** 0.466** 
Daughter 0.038** 0.331** 0.319** 0.243** 0.173** 0.094** 0.089** 0.037 
Married son 0.040** 0.350** 0.446** 0.355** 0.252** 0.310** 0.070* 0.879** 
Married daughter 0.025** 0.327** 0.317** 0.250** 0.184** 0.067** 0.138** -0.05 
Son-in-law 0.006 0.314** 0.329** 0.226** 0.177** 0.077* 0.175** -0.209* 
Daughter-in-law 0.029** 0.319** 0.200** 0.175** 0.034 0.051* -0.086* -0.219* 
* 0.05<p<0.10. ** 0.01<p<0.05. *** p<0.01 
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Table 3. Earnings and income elasticities for mother and children and children-in-law. Spline regression. 
  P0-25 P25-50 P50-75 P75-90 P90-95 P95-99 P99-99.9 P99.9-100 
Earnings 
        Son 0.013** 0.033** -0.065** 0.295** 0.328** 0.277** 0.236** -0.131 
Daughter 0.013** 0.061** 0.018 0.325** 0.354** 0.178** 0.299** -0.014 
Married son 0.011** 0.030* -0.060** 0.350** 0.258** 0.374** 0.132* -0.054 
Married daughter 0.010** 0.077** 0.018 0.313** 0.425** 0.220** 0.288** 0.029 
Son-in-law 0.01 0.007 -0.02 0.292** 0.260* 0.062 0.162 -0.018 
Daughter-in-law 0.014** 0.045** -0.002 0.239** 0.276** 0.167** 0.111 0.251 
Total income 
        Son 0.019** 0.229** -0.347** 0.448** 0.348** 0.293** 0.274** 0.094 
Daughter 0.019** 0.168** -0.153** 0.434** 0.361** 0.232** 0.220** -0.006 
Married son 0.018** 0.187** -0.281** 0.498** 0.258** 0.378** 0.190** 0.14 
Married daughter 0.015** 0.157** -0.124** 0.438** 0.360** 0.268** 0.293** -0.075 
Son-in-law 0.016** 0.060** -0.136** 0.347** 0.213* 0.208** 0.160* -0.049 
Daughter-in-law 0.015** 0.041** 0.004 0.345** 0.177** 0.210** 0.077 0.17 
* 0.05<p<0.10. ** 0.01<p<0.05. *** <0.01 
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Table 4. Correlations
1
 between second generation husband’s and wife’s income. Separately for 
earnings and total income. Quantile regression. 
  q=0.25 q=0.50 q=0.75 q=0.90 q=0.95 q=0.99 q=0.995 
Earnings.  
     Son and daughter-in-law 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.153*** 0.120*** 0.096*** 0.027 0.021 
Daughter and son-in-law 0.070*** 0.113*** 0.152*** 0.196*** 0.212*** 0.202*** 0.200*** 
Total income.  
     Son and daughter-in-law 0.280*** 0.258*** 0.214*** 0.135*** 0.104*** 0.035 0.004 
Daughter and son-in-law 0.164*** 0.199*** 0.224*** 0.249*** 0.245*** 0.188*** 0.165*** 
* 0.05<p<0.10. ** 0.01<p<0.05. *** p<0.01. 
   1All calculations based on father-son and father-daughter samples controlled for age in the regression analyses.  
  
 
Table 5. Earnings and income elasticities for first and second generation families. Pooled incomes. 
Spline regression. 
  OLS P0-25 P25-50 P50-75 P75-90 P90-95 P95-99 P99-99.9 P99.9-100 
Earnings 
         Son and wife 0.187*** 0.064** 0.268** 0.273** 0.404** 0.325** 0.220** -0.052 0.259** 
Daughter and 
husband 0.167*** 0.055** 0.260** 0.214** 0.390** 0.266** 0.085* 0.119* -0.154 
Total income 
        Son and wife 0.256*** 0.137** 0.233** 0.364** 0.448** 0.285** 0.264** 0.014 0.763** 
Daughter and 
husband 0.223*** 0.118** 0.211** 0.344** 0.376** 0.299** 0.123** 0.216** 0.018 
* 0.05<p<0.10. ** 0.01<p<0.05. *** p<0.01 
      
  
 
 
 
